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Abstract 
 
This paper looks at how social/online media – using the example of Twitter – are used in the 
politico-organizational communication of the European Union at a time when it faces multiple 
crises and is in acute need of effectively communicating its politics to the European demos. 
Proposing a critical discourse framework for the analysis of the politico-organizational use of 
Twitter, the paper shows that while, to some extent, bringing change or ‘modernization’ to EU 
political communication patterns, social/online media help in sustaining some of the deep-
seated dispositions in EU communicative and organizational practices as well as political 
discourses. As deployed by the EU's – and specifically the European Commission’s – 
spokesperson service, social/online help in solidifying some of the controversial patterns in 
EU political communication. They also bring in other, more contemporary, challenges as 
regards using Twitter and social media as parts of political and institutional/organizational 
communication. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper looks at how Twitter, a microblogging platform and social-medium most 
commonly used for purposes of contemporary political communication, is used in the context 
of the politics of the European Union (EU). The main interest of the paper is in the in-depth 
analysis of how social/online media – using the example of Twitter – are used as a tool for 
communication in/by political institutions of the EU. More specifically, the paper tackles such 
research questions as (a) whether Twitter can help in changing patterns of politico-
organization communication in/of the EU and democratizing it and (b) whether social/online 
media in general bring any new quality to the often-criticised EU political communication.  
 
Building on the above and looking specifically at the European Commission, i.e. the central 
executive branch of the EU governance system (see below), the paper hypothesizes that 
while, to some extent, bringing change or ‘modernization’ to EU political communication 
patterns, social/online media do, in fact, support sustaining, rather than eradicating, several 
of the deep-seated dispositions in EU communicative practices and political discourses. 
Hence, as this paper aims to show, social/online media do not constitute any significant 
break in EU communication policies and practices, despite often being presented as such.  
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On the contrary, as the paper shows, instead of bringing some new qualities, social media 
actually help in solidifying some, often controversial, patterns in EU political communication. 
This points to the enduring eminence of the so-called ‘linearities of organizational practice’ 
(Krzyżanowski 2011) or to the indeed peculiar ‘autopoiesis’ (Luhmann 1995; Muntigl, Weiss 
& Wodak 2000) of EU institutional organisms. Both the former and the latter remain, it 
seems, a driving force in EU political action and in communication thereof, arguably with the 
main interest being in preserving and sustaining EU institutions (and their logic, procedures, 
structures etc.), rather than changing them into political beings, as well as subsequently 
opening them up to the wider European citizenry.  
 
The research presented here is part of a larger project that looks at how social/online media 
change patterns of ‘political behaviour’, including by means of interactions between politics 
and the neighbouring areas of journalism/media on the one hand, and political PR including 
spokesperson services on the other (see e.g. Olausson 2017). The focus is on exploring the 
elitism, exclusiveness and, indeed, often non-democratic character of communication taking 
place on social media as well as showcasing that Twitter, as used in the political and wider 
public realm, far too often follows the “few-to-many” logic of closed elite networks (Berglez 
2016), rather than forging openness, interactivity and political engagement.  
 
Hence, in general terms, the current research looks at the practices wherein what is widely 
seen as ‘social media’ is not actually used for purposes that are essentially ‘social’ (or 
sometimes not even ‘political’, see below). It focuses instead on wherever interactivity and 
social/online mediation are used for the purposes of gaining or sustaining political power, 
including via hegemonic discourses mediated though online contexts, as well as via elite 
networks and practices. Therefore, the analysis looks in detail at the discourse of 
spokespeople in the political-institutional context of the EU and treats the discursive practices 
of spokespeople in social media contexts as essentially politico-organizational, yet inherently 
hybrid in nature due to their targeting of both EU internal (i.e. institutional) actors and 
politicians, as well as looking at extra-EU actors including, very prominently, national politics 
in Europe, the (in most cases traditional) European mass media and, probably at least, self-
mediated European publics.   
 
The paper looks specifically at the social-media presence of the EU as ‘created’ by the 
European Commission’s (EC) spokesperson service, i.e. the main part of the European 
Commission responsible for not only the shape but also the content of the EC and the wider 
EU social/online media presence. The paper offers a Critical Discourse Analysis of EU 
politico-organizational communication on Twitter by proposing a qualitative framework for 
Twitter (and other social media) analysis that relates interactive strategies to their discursive 
counterparts. It showcases a pathway of analysis which, on the one hand, explores how 
social media behaviour is indicative of different forms of political and otherwise understood 
networking, and is part of communicating the EU to its external environment. On the other 
hand, the focus on social media discourse allows an exploration of what kinds of key 
strategies are deployed in the EU’s social media presence and how the use of those 
discursive strategies underlines some of the key tendencies indicated above (autopoiesis, 
closeness etc.), while pointing to processes of recontextualisation (Bernstein 1990; 
Krzyżanowski 2016) of discursive elements across spatial and temporal scales. Relating both 
the above levels/areas of analysis is vital for not only showing the actual form/content of EU 
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online and social media discourse, but also depicting how the relationship between ‘Twitter 
behaviour’ and ‘Twitter discourse’ is indicative of wider processes, e.g. the elitisation of EU 
communication in the process of building and sustaining networks with selected, in most 
cases elite, media, political actors and audiences.      
 
2. The European Union, External Communication and Online/Social Media  
 
Many classic works on the EU’s external communication (see esp. Michailidou 2008) 
emphasise that the latter has traditionally been challenged by many shortcomings which, as 
such, questioned the de facto political character of the EU. Communication has surely never 
been at the forefront of EU interests and policies with the majority of the EU institutions – 
especially the intergovernmental Council of the EU, and to a lesser degree the EU’s 
executive, i.e. the European Commission (EC) – traditionally operating a closed-door policy 
and contacting their external environment through official spokespeople. In this way, the EU 
has also, for a very long time, escaped the scholarly interest of (political) communication 
research, so there are very few examples either of the former within the EU institutional 
system (cf. also Schlesinger 1999 and 2003).  
 
Also, although most of the European institutions have been around for several years, the 
majority of them have, until recently, looked only very reluctantly at the issue of external 
communication in general, and at communication between those institutions and the wider 
European public, media etc., in particular. This has been the case for, inter alia, the widely-
debated EU ‘organizational cultures’ (Krzyżanowski 2011) which, as such, have extensively 
borrowed from other transnational (and in particular intergovernmental) milieus many of their 
organizational procedures. These included patterns and ways of shaping the institutions’ 
internal and external communication and were, often not surprisingly, very often based on 
intra- and inter-institutional secrecy, rather than openness and transparency. It seems that, at 
a time when the EU was increasingly becoming a political supranational structure and 
required increased support and closer connections to the European citizenry (see, inter alia, 
Nicolaïdis 2010), its institutions hardly followed suit in opening up by means of (online) 
communication or strengthening a much needed coordinated inter-institutional 
communication policy (Krzyżanowski 2012).  
 
Accordingly, while most of the EU institutions have developed their own spokesperson 
services – probably most elaborate in the case of the EC, as analysed below – all of those 
services were focused on ‘informing about’ the EU and its actions, rather than on 
‘communicating between’ those institutions and the European public. That situation did not 
change, even during the initial crises of the EU institutions in the late 1990s (e.g. the 1999 
crisis of the Santer Commission), when a drive towards political communication rather than 
just top-down information would certainly have helped in eradicating some of the then key 
criticisms of the EU system (Meyer 1999; Anderson & McLeod 2004; Schneeberger and 
Sarikakis, 2008).   
 
A period of, unfortunately not enduring, change in EU external communication arrived in the 
early 2000s and was characterised by a profound institutional overhaul of, in particular, the 
EC (Anderson & McLeod 2004; Kassim 2008) and, later on, the development of an EU 
Communication Policy in the aftermath of the EU’s so-called constitutional crisis in the years 
2003–7 (see esp. Krzyżanowski 2012). Especially in the latter period, the EU turned 
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increasingly to new forms of communicating with its citizens and to some extent embraced 
the then available modi of online communication, including, most prominently, online fora 
(see Wodak and Wright 2006; Krzyżanowski & Oberhuber 2007). At this time, as part of its 
aforementioned policy, the EC also issued the famous document “Communicating about 
Europe via the Internet, Engaging the citizens” (European Commission 2007) which, albeit 
quite vaguely, pleaded that the EU must increase its use of online affordances to 
communicate with European citizens in a much more concise and efficient manner.  
 
However, still before the arrival of social media as a widespread political communication tool 
(see above), the EU started to gradually retreat from its wider thinking about online (political) 
communication, especially following some of its failures in the period after the 2008 
Economic Crisis. Eventually, with the 2010 changes to the EC set-up, the aforementioned 
EU Communication policy was largely abandoned (including the controversial removal of an 
EU Commissioner for Communication post) and returned de facto to the EC’s Directorate 
General Communication, i.e. predominantly the EC spokesperson service. Here, one could 
observe, in particular, a retreat to the classic approach to ‘information’, rather than political or 
other ‘communication’. However, as evidenced though the analysis presented below, some 
aspects of especially top-down political communication known from national politics (see 
above) – and in particular the formation of elitist networks between politicians, spokespeople 
and journalists – could also be clearly observed in the EU’s presence on social media which 
eventually developed in the second decade of the 2000s.  
 
Yet, it would be a mistake to say that the European Union is not present in social and online 
media, especially as a topic of political debates. Research has shown, for example, that the 
move towards an online presence by the traditional mass media has accelerated many 
online debates about the EU (see esp. de Wilde, Michailidou & Trenz 2013; Michailidou, 
Trenz & de Wilde 2014; Barisione and Michailidou 2017), while at the same time often 
solidifying patterns of contestation of European ideas, as in national-political arenas. Work 
that has focused explicitly on social media and/or Twitter (see esp. Michailidou 2017) 
emphasizes this trend, yet it shows that while EU-related topics do occupy a significant 
chunk of online media debates at present, the EU as such is not a significant ‘influencer’ of 
EU-specific debates, contrary to national public spheres where European ideas are still 
nested and contested (see also Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou & Wodak, 2009). Thus, the EU 
clearly trails behind, especially those national politicians and journalists who set the tone in 
debates on European matters. In a similar vein, the character of social media discourse 
about the EU and European politics has clearly diversified. While it is often strictly induced by 
EU-related events (e.g. EP Elections), or policies and actions (e.g. with regard to the recent 
‘Refugee Crisis’), there is very limited input into those debates from EU-institutional actors as 
such, and definitely almost none on Twitter and Facebook (Bosetta, Dutceac-Segesten and 
Trenz, 2017).    
 
Of the EU institutions present on social/online media, probably the major one remains the 
European Parliament (EP), i.e. the only directly-elected EU institution, chosen every five 
years by means of universal suffrage across all EU member states. Existent scholarship has 
shown, for example, that EP candidates have extensively deployed social media in their pre-
election campaigns for several years now (Rodríguez and Garmendia Madariaga 2016). 
Similarly, social media have been key in the peculiar process of the ‘permanent’ political 
campaigning of EP Members (Larsson 2015), indeed often in similar ways to the electoral 
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social-media use known from national contexts (esp. in the context of right-wing populist 
parties, see Krzyżanowski 2013). Other research has also shown that especially the 
coverage of EP elections in the national media (e.g. via televised debates and the like) has a 
direct influence on relevant political social media content as well as on the public’s interest in 
the candidates, as expressed in interactions on, for example, Twitter (Nulty et al. 2016).  
 
All of the above, however, point to the still isolated instances where the EU makes its way 
into social/online media reality. They show that the EU still does not have – or is not 
interested in – a strategy that, via its own communicative channels on social media, would 
allow either quantitative or qualitative increases in its presence in EU-related debates. 
Indeed, the above results from the EU’s apparent lack of a clear understanding of its 
potential interlocutor ‘publics’ (Tarta 2017) that could effectively be reached, as well as 
engaged in debating, as well as improving European institutions and politics via social and 
online media channels.  
 
3. Twitter ‘Behaviour’, Twitter ‘Discourse’ and EU Spokespeople: Analysis 
 
3.1. Design of the Study 
 
The aim of the analysis below is to highlight similarities and differences between the Twitter 
practices of key members of the EC Spokesperson’s service in the previous (2009–14) as 
well as the current (2015–19) term of the European Commission.  
 
Explored here from the point of view of its social media presence, the EC Spokesperson’s 
Service is an integral part of the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Communication (DG COMM), i.e. the section of the EC responsible for “informing and 
communicating about the policies of the European Union with the public at large”.1 Although 
the remit of the Spokesperson’s Service is narrower than that of the entire DG COMM – 
boiling down to contacts and communication with the media – it is widely known that the 
Service is the central source of both information about EU actions and politics in a wider 
sense, and EU’s own social media discourse about EU politics and policies.2  
 
The aim of the analysis below is showcase key tendencies in the interactive and discursive 
behaviour of EC Spokespeople on Twitter, as well as to observe the dynamics of and change 
in their interactions/discourse. That dynamics are grasped over two sample periods of one 
																																																						
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/communication/about/index_en.htm and  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/organisation-chart-dg-comm_en_14.pdf, last accessed 
28/12/2017.  
2 As such, the EC Spokesperson’s Service is organised in a rather strict hierarchical way. It is headed 
by an EC Chief Spokesperson (who is also a Deputy Director General at the wider DG COMM), 
supported by two Deputy Chief Spokespersons as well as two Coordinating Spokespersons, including 
one with a remit for the Activities of the EC President. The aforementioned group of key spokespeople 
is then further supported by an array of Spokespersons specialising within specific policy areas of the 
EC and who, at the same time, work closely with the EU Commissioners in charge of those policy 
areas (for details, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/communication/about/contact_us/ec_spokespersons/index_en.htm, last 
accessed 08/02/2017).    
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month each, observed in 2014 and 2015, in-between which the cohort of EC spokespeople 
underwent a very substantial change. Whereas in the period 2009–14 – covered by the 2014 
analysis – members of the Service were still mainly recruited from among skilful and long-
serving EC (and wider EU) officials (thus catering for a large degree of uniformity of 
experience and skills in the Service), as of 2015, the group became much more hybrid to 
then include not only EC/EU officials but also many former journalists who previously 
covered EU affairs across EU countries.  
 
The above change might, on the one hand, be considered a case of professionalization of 
the service, especially since it follows the traditional pattern of media-to-spokespeople 
migration often encountered in political PR. On the other hand, however, it has certainly 
meant a change in and a break from many practices, perhaps especially as far as social 
media are concerned. For example, current members of the EC Spokesperson’s Service 
widely use strongly personalised Twitter accounts (@NameSurname or similar, sometimes 
with the addition ‘EC’), while in the previous EC term several key spokespeople used 
standardised institutional-like account names (esp. @ECSpokesNAME). This shows a 
tendency towards personalisation of the service as well as, very likely, also being a strategy 
whereby many new EC spokespeople – especially those recruited from outside EU 
institutions – could retain their ‘previous’ identities as well as contacts and networks and 
continue using them while working for the EC.       
 
The analysis below covers interactions and discourse in the Twitter activity of five key 
spokespeople in the 2009–14 term of the European Commission (2014 analysis) and seven 
spokespeople in the 2015–19 term (2015 analysis). The analysis is performed on, in total, a 
data set of 519 tweets/retweets, of which 316 were posted in 2014, and 203 in 2015. The 
relatively small/medium size of the data set is intended to enable in-depth analysis along 
both the aforementioned interaction- and discourse-oriented lines. The difference in the 
numbers of accounts stems from the lower degree of Twitter activity in the latter period. 
 
In both cases, the analysis follows a sample period of 30 days and covers the days 1–30 
April of, respectively, 2014 and 2015. The aforementioned change in the EC term took place 
in autmn 2014, i.e. in-between the two periods of investigation. The selection of the month of 
April as a period of analysis was not arbitrary, as this is traditionally a month of moderate (i.e. 
relatively usual) Twitter activity which includes both increased periods (especially in some 
unexpected situations) as well as ‘quieter’ periods (esp. around the Easter break). Analysing 
tweets in April also allows diversity in tweets. Due to the EU Calendar – and several key 
dates/anniversaries in early May (May-Day celebrations and Anniversary of 2004 EU 
Enlargement on 1 May, Day of Europe on 9 May etc.), the month of April usually constitutes 
a run-up to many of those events and hence includes EU social media discourse that not 
only focuses on day-to-day activities and policy-related tweets, but also wider discourses 
about Europe, including its history, future, global role etc.   
 
3.2. Pathways and Categories of Analysis 
 
The analysis performed here falls into two areas (see Fig. 1). The first area of analysis looks 
at the interactive strategies deployed in social media communication by members of the EC 
Spokesperson’s Service. Here, the main interest is in both de facto performed interactivity 
(especially by means of re-tweets, or RTs, from other accounts) but also in the intended 
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interactivity as displayed by both thematic mentions and interactions (by means of ‘#’-tagged 
hashtags as well as weblinks included in the tweets) and personal mentions and interactions 
(by means of account references @Name). 
 
The aim of the first area of the analysis is to display the extent to which the analysed Twitter 
presence is in fact self-constructed – including by means of one’s own tweets, or Ts – by EU 
sources, or whether it relies on social media content produced by other actors, including 
those replicated by means of RTs from across non-EU (institutional) accounts. As far as the 
latter are concerned, the main interest is in the typology of sources and targets of 
interactions initiated on Twitter by members of the EC Spokesperson’s Service. The analysis 
here aims to assess to what extent the social media input that the spokespeople rely on 
comes from EU-internal or EU-external sources and, if so, whether any relevant tendencies 
or regularities (or lack thereof) in online interactive ‘behaviour’ can in fact be observed, 
especially as far as the variety of ‘externally’ oriented and politically-driven interactions is 
concerned. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  
Critical Discourse Framework  
for the Analysis of Interactive vs Discursive Strategies on Twitter 
  
Meanwhile, the second area of analysis looks at discursive strategies and focuses explicitly 
on the Twitter discourse of key members of the EC Spokesperson’s Service. Here, the 
examination of discourse follows the usual two-level analysis as deployed in, in particular, 
the Discourse-Historical Analysis in Critical Discourse Studies (see esp. Krzyżanowski 2010). 
Hence, at first, the analysis focuses on general maps of themes (topics) in the analysed 
Twitter data and looks for the semantic meaning of Ts/RTs. It attempts to classify them as 
belonging to wider thematic areas/threads characteristic of the studied contexts (in the 
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current case, EU institutions as well as non-EU contexts). On the other hand, the more in-
depth discourse analysis pertains to following the key arguments and strategies deployed in 
the Twitter discourse in a pragmatic way, often wholly relying on the semantic aspects 
indicated above. Here, the key interest is in following patterns of construction of one’s own 
ideas as well as the purposeful/strategic recontextualisation (Bernstein 1990; Krzyżanowski 
2016) of arguments and ideas from other discourses, be they originating within or outside EU 
institutions, and recontextualised both synchronically and diachronically.   
 
Indeed, the recontextualising aspect lays the foundation of the second strand of the analysis. 
Here, drawing on existent literature and, in particular, on previous critical analyses of EU 
discourse, one can establish a set of prototypical tendencies that can then be tested to see if, 
and to what extent, they are present and deployed in the analysed Twitter material to hand. 
Among the key tendencies used as a point of reference, one should certainly mention, first 
and foremost: the ongoing struggle between political and democratic discussions about the 
EU on the one hand, and how it is economically-driven, up to neoliberal framing, on the other 
(Krzyżanowski 2016), the EU’s ever-prevalent tendency to discursively revisit and 
reconstruct its own identity (and history) including while fostering one’s self-perception as a 
global leader in policy and humanitarian actions  (see Krzyżanowski 2015) or while arguing 
for the EU as the fulfilment of long-standing – and often pre-EU-institutional  – visions of 
Europeanness (Krzyżanowski 2010).    
 
3.3. Analysis of Interactive Strategies 
 
An analysis of the EC Spokesperson’s Service’s interactive strategies on Twitter shows that 
within the two periods of investigation – i.e. throughout April 2014 and April 2015, 
respectively – there was a rather significant drop in the online activity of the analysed 
accounts. This, as indicated above, took place even despite the fact that the number of 
accounts covered by the analysis in the second period was much larger than in the first one.  
 
While in April 2014 the overall number of analysed tweets and retweets (henceforth Ts and 
RTs) from the EC spokespeople accounts numbered 316, in 2015 the total was almost a 
third less and numbered, in total, 203 Ts/RTs. Despite that significant difference in the totals, 
the cumulative numbers of Ts and RTs, and the ‘own’ Ts to RTs ratio, remained largely the 
same in both of the analysed periods, while oscillating at approximately 60% of all posts (with 
189 RTs or 59.8 % in 2014, and 125 RT posts or 61.5% in 2015).  
 
In a similar vein, and again despite the significant cumulative differences in the total numbers 
of Ts and RTs, similar tendencies occurred in the level of interactivity assessed via the ratio 
of retweeting from ‘own’ EU-originating (institutional) accounts vs non-EU ones. The 
percentage of RTs from EU vs non-EU Twitter accounts clearly turned in favour of the former 
with, on average, approximately 75% of all RTs of the analysed accounts coming from EU 
sources (specifically: 138 RTs or 73% in 2014, and 97 RTs or 77% in 2015).  
 
A more qualitative look at the sources of RTs and of the wider interactive strategies in the EU 
spokespeople discourse reveals tendencies of both continuity and change (see Table 1). The 
continuity aspect is particularly visible within EU-internal sources, which practically did not 
change between the two focal periods of investigation. Accordingly, the main RT sources 
were the Twitter accounts of other EU (EC) Spokespeople and EU politicians, of whom the 
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key ones were European Commission members (whose accounts, by the way, are often 
managed by the spokespeople responsible for particular Commissioners and portfolios). 
Other internal accounts included, very prominently, other European Commission Directorates 
General (DGs) which were the source of RTs especially whenever specific policies or areas 
of activity within the remit of those DGs were highlighted in debates. In a similar way, the 
accounts of specific European Commission Field Offices (present in each of the EU member 
states) were also used as sources of RTs. From other EU – but non-EC – sources, EU 
Spokespeople RTs mainly originated within the European Parliament (and specifically the 
accounts of its members, or MEPs), as well as within EU Agencies’ accounts. Some RTs 
were, finally, also taken from generic institutional accounts (such as @EU, 
@EU_Commission), which are, however, run by the very same spokespeople that initiated 
the RTs.  
 
RT Sources 
 
2014 
 
2015 
EU-Internal 
Sources 
 
EC Spokespeople 
EU Politicians 
(esp. EC members) 
EC DGs & Services 
Field Offices & Reps 
EP Members 
EU Agencies 
Generic Profiles 
(@EU, @EU_Commission) 
 
EC Spokespeople 
EU Politicians 
(esp. EC members) 
EC DGs & Services 
Field Offices & Reps 
EU Agencies 
EP Members 
Generic Profiles 
(@EU_Commission) 
EU-External 
Sources 
Journalists 
(esp ex. national media) 
EU Member-state Politicians 
Pro-EU Think Tanks & NGOs 
(e.g. Euractiv) 
Political Parties 
 
Ext. Organisations 
(e.g. EBF, German Marshall Fund) 
Econ. Consultancies 
Journalists 
EU-Member-State Politicians 
Non-EU Politicians 
 
 
Table 1:  
Outline of Sources for Retweets within the Analysed EU Spokespeople Accounts 
(April 2014 & 2015) 
 
Unlike EU-internal sources which remained largely the same within both of the periods of 
investigation, a rather significant change occurred in the array of external source accounts of 
EU Spokespeople’s retweets. And so, in 2014, the main external sources were those of 
journalists, especially those known for their pro-EU opinions and working for large media 
organisations in key EU countries. Similarly, EU national media (e.g. @LesEchos or 
@LeFigaro in France) were still the main RT sources for EU spokespeople in 2014. The 
above were followed by the accounts of EU-friendly think tanks and NGOs or their 
representatives/leaders (e.g. @EurActiv), as well as by political parties in EU member states 
(e.g. @partisocialiste in France).    
 
In 2015, on the other hand, the array of source accounts for the retweets of EU 
Spokespeople changed rather significantly. The main source, unlike the previous period of 
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investigation, was now various international organizations (EBF, German Marshall Fund or 
the like), as well as economic consultancies. This shows that with the arrival of several 
former journalists as EU spokespeople in 2015, their ‘use’ for other journalists and media as 
sources significantly decreased, as well as giving more voice to non-EU institutional bodies. 
Indeed, journalists, who only came after the above as key RT sources, were only followed by 
EU member-state and third-country politicians’ accounts (e.g. the Ukrainian President 
@poroshenko) as well as by the accounts of EU officials and politicians including, very 
prominently, Euro-Parliamentarians.  
 
3.4. Analysis of Key Discursive Strategies 
 
An initial, theme-oriented look at EC Spokespeople discourse confirms that some rather 
significant changes occurred between the 2014 and 2015 periods of investigation, including 
the related change in the set-up of the spokespeople cohort. By the same token, it should be 
noticed that, although quantitatively ‘smaller’ than its 2014 counterpart, the 2015 discourse 
was much richer in terms of the variety of topics and issues debated on Twitter by EC 
Spokespeople (see Table 2)   
 
In 2014, with the still strictly EU-internal set-up of key EU Spokespeople personnel, the 
thematic focus of Twitter discourse remained very strongly EU-internally-oriented. It focused 
on imminent EU-specific events including, most prominently, the 2014 European Parliament 
elections (eventually held 22–25 May 2014), as well as on one symbolic event for the 10th 
anniversary of the 2004 EU Enlargement (on 1 May). The event-specific discourse in 2014 
also revolved around events related to the then ongoing actions between Euro-group and 
Greece aiming to end the latter’s economic and fiscal crisis, then seen as gravely 
endangering the stability of the European Monetary Union. 
 
In fact, the Euro-group and Greece theme remained the only one of the EU-internally-
oriented ones that became equally evident in the 2015 discourse where, however, the latter 
clearly started to give way to representations of events and EU activities related to the then 
dominating EU-wide ‘Refugee Crisis’ (named throughout most of the EU Twitter discourse 
the ‘Migration’ crisis). Unlike the 2014 discourse, the 2015 one also included EU-policy-
oriented debates: on matters such as the EU Capital Markets Union (clearly foregrounded by 
the then EU Commissioner for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets 
Union, Jonathan Hill, see below) and those related to EU antitrust and competition policies 
and actions, and especially the ‘Google’ Anti-Trust Case driven by Margrethe Vestager (EU 
Commissioner for Competition) and announced in mid-April 2015.  
 
As far as EU-externally focused topics were concerned, in 2014, those were very limited and 
only focused on the then ongoing Ukraine Crisis in a rather strictly event-oriented manner. In 
fact, the Ukraine Crisis remained prominent in the EU-external discourse in 2015 as well, 
though in a strictly event-related manner, and it gave way to tweets concerning the Nepal 
Earthquake that took place on 25 April. Unlike in 2014, when there were no externally-
oriented policy-specific tweets, in 2015 there was already an ongoing, policy-driven 
discussion of the aforementioned EU Migration crisis. Here, however, the topic was 
perceived from the point of view of non-EU actors and members. Of these, special attention 
was paid to African countries and regional alliances – e.g. the African Union – which also 
drove a separate topic focusing more closely on EU-Africa relations and related policies. 
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Themes 
(Types of Threads) 
 
2014 2015 
EU-Internal 
(Event-related) 
 
EP Elections 2014 
10 years of 2004 EU Enlargement 
Euro-group & Greece 
 
EU Migration ‘Crisis’ 
Euro-group & Greece 
 
EU-Internal 
(Policy-related) 
 
N/A Capital Markets Union Google & Competition 
 
EU-External 
(Event-related) 
 
Ukraine Crisis Ukraine Crisis Nepal Earthquake 
 
EU-External  
(Policy-related) 
 
N/A European Migration ‘Crisis’ EU-Africa Relations 
 
Table 2:  
Key Hash-Tagged Themes of the Analysed 2014 and 2015 EC Spokespeople Discourse 
 
A more in-depth look at selected discursive strategies deployed in the EC spokespeople 
discourse in 2014 and 2015 shows, just like above, little continuity and a rather clear 
tendency to change.  
 
In the 2014 discourse, the strategy of personalisation/familiarisation was dominant. It was 
deployed to give some familiarity and a less official tone to discourses about EU politics, 
especially at a time when the entire cohort of EC spokespeople was still recruited from 
among long-standing EU officials and functionaries. This strategy was, on the one hand, 
deployed to express various affinities and similarities in viewpoints. This was particularly 
visible in the RTs from media organizations which were retweeted along often nationally 
specific lines (with the German member of the spokesperson’s service retweeting 
@spiegelonline, the French one @Le_Figaro or the Polish one @gazeta_wyborcza etc.).  
 
On the other hand, this strategy of personalisation/familiarisation was chiefly used to create 
commonality with the Twitter ‘audience’, especially by presenting EU officials (incl. 
Commissioners and Spokespeople) not only from the point of view of their official roles and 
activities, but also as those who are close to EU demos, as people who not only work but 
also make jokes, have a social life etc.  
 
One of (many) examples of when such a strategy was deployed was in early April 2014, 
when the then EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, sent a tweet 
‘thanking’ the press service for the so-called Brussels Press Review, i.e. an annual social 
event for journalists and the EU (it usually includes many sketches about EU politics mainly 
prepared by journalists and spokespeople). In a thread initiated by the Commissioner’s 
account @MalmstromEU (see Example 1), a spokesperson – in this case @OliverBaillyEU – 
 12 
joined in to share his experiences and initiated a very peculiar exchange which, later on, was 
also joined by other Commission officials (in this case, @trishbrussels). In the exchange, in 
which replies across accounts were used, it was seen that spokespeople were not only 
‘relaying’ messages but were also close to and very familiar with EU politicians and officials, 
as well as sharing not only their professional interests but also private/social views.         
 
 Example 1: 
 
@MalmstromEU, 05/04/2014  
Great Brussel press revue this year! Thanks for a good show with many laughs 
@TeresaKuchler  
 
@OliverBaillyEU, 05/04/2014:  
@MalmstromEU My favourite was certainly "10 years a slave”  
05/04/14  
 
@OliverBaillyEU – RT from @MalmstromEU, 05/04/2014:  
“@OlivierBaillyEU:@MalmstromEU My favourite was certainly "10 years a slave" :-)”Mine too!   
 
@trishbrussels – Reply to @MalmstromEU, 05/04/2014 
@MalmstromEU @OlivierBaillyEU Lisbon Treaty goes to the repair shop was a piece of 
brilliance too. 
 
Another strategy salient in the 2014 EC Spokespeople discourse was that of thematic 
demarcation/colonisation. It mainly boiled down to EC spokespeople (over)using various 
hashtags to show that EU policy is not limited to a few areas but has some wide and very 
significant meanings. Indeed, the use of many hashtags by the EC spokespeople seems too 
generic, yet it helped the officials to create an image of the EU as highly relevant not only for 
selected foci/issues but also for wider (tagged) spaces, events etc. One example of the 
deployment of this strategy was in an RT by one of the spokespeople (@PiaAhrenkilde) from 
the account of the then EC Commissioner for Transport (@SimKallas, see Example 2). In the 
RT, practically only hashtags and other non-tagged keywords were used to 
demarcate/colonise as many areas/topics/spaces as possible, and thus emphasise the 
salience of EU policies on all those areas.  
 
Example 2: 
@PiaAhrenkilde – RT from @SiimKallasEU, 15/04/2014 
MEPs vote 4 #safer, #greener #lorries, cutting fuel costs, emissions and road deaths. 
#EUtransport #cyclists http://t.co/Ro1x2S53xB 
 
Further to the above, the strategy of thematic demarcation/colonisation was also used 
extensively in EC spokespeople discourse to describe historical events, rather than only 
present actions/policies, as seen above. Interestingly, the thematic demarcation/colonisation 
of history extended well beyond the EU’s lifespan and even embraced events such as, for 
example, the Prague Spring (see Example 3). This shows that the EU history-oriented 
discourse – indeed very strongly revived in 2014, i.e. at the time of the 10th anniversary of the 
‘historical’ EU 2004 Enlargement – was constructed by EC spokespeople in a way that 
represented the EU as, in fact, extending beyond its institutional spatio-temporal range, as 
well as presenting the EU as a fulfilment of many civil ideas across Europe in the post-war 
period.  
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Example 3: 
@ECspokesCezary, 29/04/2014 
A. #Dubček Europe is a living organism linked together through common history and destiny 
and hopes for freedom and better living conditions  
    
Further to such ‘quote’-based Tweets, the history-oriented discourse also included many RTs 
from media organisations (e.g. @spiegelonline) and this helped to create a positive image of 
the EU as successful, or even ‘triumphant’, in its policies and actions.3 
 
Of the aforementioned 2014 strategies, the key – and only – one that continued in the 2015 
discourse was the strategy of personalisation/familiarisation. However, in the 2015 discourse, 
that strategy was no longer aiming, as before, to create an image of closeness or familiarity 
of EU officials and politicians – including spokespeople – to the European demos. On the 
contrary, it was now been transformed into a rather clearly elite-driven strategy of political 
communication and was chiefly deployed to create and mediate the political image of key EU 
figures such as, very prominently, the EU Commissioners. The latter used both their own 
Twitter accounts (as was the case with the French commissioner @pierremoscovici in 
Example 4, below; NB: note the very strong personalisation via use of I/my and other 
personal pronouns) and the channels of EC Spokespeople (in this case, @vannesamock) 
who, via their RTs, provided further dissemination of the Commissioners’ politically self-
centred communication. Interestingly, even if thematically operating within discourse on 
international affairs (e.g. the Greek Crisis), this strategy was mainly deployed to address the 
national audiences of countries from where the commissioners were recruited, along with the 
national media in those countries (in Example 4, below, French and French-language media 
like @RFI or @ARTEfr).  
 
Example 4:  
@vanessamock - RT from @pierremoscovici, 12/04/15 
Mes réponses dans l'émission @CarrefourEurope à écouter tout de suite sur @RFI 
http://m.rfi.fr 
 
@vanessamock - RT from @pierremoscovici, 12/04/15 
L'#Europe n'est pas faite pour punir, mais pour convaincre les pays d'avancer. Je veux une 
Europe des réussites @CarrefourEurope @RFI 
 
@vanessamock - RT from @pierremoscovici, 28/04/15 
La @EU_Commission est là pour aider la #Grèce et les Grecs. Il n'y a pas de temps à perdre 
@ARTEfr @ARTEjournal 
 
@vanessamock - RT from @pierremoscovici, 29/04/15 
The recovery in #Europe – the way forward: my introductory remarks today at the @gmfus in 
#Washington #GMFEurope http://bit.ly/1CPRu7M 
 
Further to the above, the 2015 EC spokespeople discourse was also strongly characterised 
by frequent use of the discursive strategy of constructing the EU as an international leader. 
As part of this strategy, tweets – along with many other genres of both online and offline 
politico-organizational communication – were deployed to create an image of the EU as a 
responsible international actor, and indeed a leader of international activities in 
humanitarianism and other areas. This image was particularly desirable at a time when the 
																																																						
3 See http://www.spiegel.de/forum/wirtschaft/zehn-jahre-eu-osterweiterung-der-triumph-des-sanften-
imperiums-thread-125127-1.html of 30/04/2014 (last accessed 30/11/2017). 
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EU’s reaction to variety crises and events of a short-term (e.g. earthquakes and other 
disasters) and long-term (e.g. European Migration/Refugee Crisis) nature was in focus (see 
Example 5). It constitutes a recontextualisation of a classic trait in EU identity that shows the 
EU as a global leader, whether in humanitarian or other types of ‘response’ to international 
and global crises.  
 
Example 5:  
@Marg_Schinas, 19/04/15 
@EU_Commission statement on tragic developments in the Mediterranean. A joint 
responsibility of EU MS & Institutions http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_STATEMENT-15-
4800_en.htm 
 
@Mina_Andreeva, 26/04/15 
#NepalEarthquake: EU mobilises all emergency response means http://europa.eu/!yw67Ny 
 
However, the problem with the above strategy was that, as such, it was part of presenting a 
general, or macro-level, voice of the EC (incl. via the Head and Deputy Head of the 
Spokesperson service, as above). At the same time, individual EU Commissioners – and 
their relevant Spokespeople – continued their communication on their portfolio/policy-specific 
topics and issues. This often led to rather unfortunate – and highly insensitive – coincidences 
whereby tweets about important human and natural disasters were immediately followed, in 
sequence, by those, for example, related to economic policy (such as the Capital Markets 
Union promoted by the then EU Commissioner Jonathan Hill, see Tables 3 & 4). This proved 
to be not only politically and image-wise insensitive but tortured the cliché that, no matter 
what the topic, the EU’s economic – and indeed neoliberal – considerations tend to resurface 
across the board and at the least desirable times.  
 
 
Date 
 
Account 
 
RT/Source 
Account 
 
 
Tweet 
19/04/2015 @NatashaBertaud  
@EU_Commission statement on 
#Mediterranean tragedy: @JunckerEU 
@TimmermansEU @Avramopoulos 
@FedericaMog 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_STATEMENT-15-4800_en.htm 
… 
19/04/2015 @Mina_Andreeva @EU_Commission 
Deeply chagrined by the tragic 
developments in the #Mediterranean 
today, but also over the past 
days&weeks. Statement 
http://europa.eu/!pG97FU 
19/04/2015 @MargSchinas  
@EU_Commission statement on tragic 
developments in the Mediterranean. A 
joint responsibility of EU MS & Institutions 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_STATEMENT-15-4800_en.htm 
… 
19/04/2015 @NatashaBertaud @JunckerEU 
The @EU_Commission is deeply 
chagrined by the tragic developments in 
 15 
the Mediterranean. Our actions must be 
bold http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_STATEMENT-15-4800_en.htm 
… 
19/04/2015 @NatashaBertaud  
Statement by Commissioner 
@Avramopoulos and Spanish Minister of 
the Interior, Jorge Fernández Díaz 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_STATEMENT-15-4801_en.htm 
… 
19/04/2015 @vanessamock @EU_Commission 
Live chat w/ @JHillEU on 
#CapitalMarketsUnion Monday 20/4 
15.30CET Get alerted when it starts: 
http://ow.ly/LKo0I 
19/04/2015 @vanessamock @JHillEU 
#CapitalMarketsUnion: breaking down 
barriers to completing the single market. 
Full speech #newsmaker @reuters 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-15-4796_en.htm … 
  
Table 3: Immediate Sequence of EC Spokespeople Tweets  
about the Mediterranean Migrant Boat Tragedy / Capital Markets Union, 19/04/2015 
 
 
Date 
 
Account 
 
RT/Source 
Account 
 
 
Tweet 
25/04/2015 @MargSchinas  
Statement on the #earthquake in #Asia. 
@FedericaMog @StylianidesEU 
@MimicaEU  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_STATEMENT-15-4857_en.htm 
… 
26/04/2015 @Mina_Andreeva  
#NepalEarthquake: EU mobilises all 
emergency response means 
http://europa.eu/!yw67Ny   
27/04/2015 @vanessamock @JHillEU 
#CapitalMarketsUnion can play pivotal 
role in boosting financial integration & in 
enhancing financial stability 
@EU_Commission 
27/04/2015 @vanessamock @JHillEU 
By helping to create a more diversified & 
resilient European financial system, we 
can reinforce financial stability 
@EU_Finance 
27/04/2015 @vanessamock @JHillEU 
Read my full speech at joint 
@EU_Commission & @ecb conference 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-15-4861_en.htm … 
27/04/2015 @vanessamock @EU_Finance 
Follow our joint conference with @ecb 
live here: http://ow.ly/M9yFH . Now 
keynote address by @JHillEU 
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Table 4: Immediate Sequence of EC Spokespeople Tweets  
about the Nepal Earthquake and Capital Markets Union, 25–27/04/2015 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The above analysis indicates that the EU strives to be present on Twitter in a variety of ways 
and that EC Spokespeople are the main driving force behind creating as well as sustaining 
the EU’s social media profile. As the analysis shows, this presence boils down to a variety of 
topics and issues and aims to foster an overall image of the EU as not only a good and skilful 
communicator but also as a responsible, international actor. It also promotes – albeit with 
often mixed results – an image of EU officials and politicians as familiar with and close to the 
European demos, and thereby aims to foster an image of the EU as an open, democratic, 
politico-institutional actor.  
 
However, as the analysis also explicitly shows, EU social/online media communication, as 
exemplified by EC spokespeople’s use of Twitter, suffers from two types of challenges. On 
the one hand, as shown by both the interactive and the discourse-oriented analyses above, 
despite using ‘new’ channels such as Twitter, the EU still largely replicates many facets of its 
previous (or pre-social-media) politico-organizational communication. This boils down to re-
using some of the key discursive traits of, inter alia, speaking about the EU as an 
international leader/actor or viewing it as a fulfilment of Europe’s history (see Krzyżanowski 
2010, 2015), treating the EU as a new kind of normative or soft power (Diez 2005; Manners 
and Diez 2007) or foregrounding economic (neoliberal) ideas over social and political 
considerations (Krzyżanowski 2016).  
 
By the same token, even while on Twitter, EU communication seems very elitist and largely 
autopoietic (Luhmann 1995; Muntigl, Weiss and Wodak 2000; Krzyżanowski 2010). It hence 
remains rather strictly closed within the EU politico-institutional realm (be it of the EC as such 
or of other EU institutions), with the main ‘external’ input being drawn from wider elite 
networks of, in particular, national European media and journalists (and only to a limited 
extent including the pan-European non-governmental sector, though strictly limited to EU-
friendly organizations, see above). This, as has been indicated above, comes on top of the 
still evident lack of desire to connect to the wider European citizenry (esp. by means of social 
media interactions which clearly create such an opportunity) and with the clear intention of 
operating with elite networks that help to sustain the ongoing autopoiesis, rather than seek 
effective democratisation of EU politico-organizational communication.  
 
On the other hand, while still sustaining the said problematic deep-seated dispositions of its 
communication and discourse, the use of Twitter by the EU – in our case especially the EC – 
falls prey to challenges of using social/online media as elements of organizational as well as 
political communication. The widely deployed and, as evidenced, gradually transforming 
personalisation/familiarisation strategy is a good example here. It shows how the use of 
social media gradually contributes to the replacement of collective (organizational as well as 
wider democratic) concerns via the very strong individualisation of communication (Bennett 
and Entman 1999), as also seen in the wider field of mediated ‘digital’ politics (Vaccari 2013). 
In this context, the very strong focus on the construction of individual political personas (such 
as mediatisation-savvy EU Commissioners) – and indeed their own images, careers and 
interests – replaces the otherwise desired construction of familiarity with (EU) politics as part 
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of familiarising the wider public with not only the ‘frontstage’ but also the ‘backstage’ of 
everyday politics (Wodak 2009). To be sure, this comes alongside other typical tendencies in 
the public/political use of social media, such as those whereby highly performative and 
superfluous ‘few to many’ communication (Berglez 2016) prevails, thus ignoring 
communication for political or democratic meanings and instead forging self-presentation as 
well as the self-preservation of elite-driven networks.     
 
By the same token, as indicated above, the Twitter-based communication of the EU also 
tends to be, just like in many other political contexts, very accidental and often cuts across a 
largely desired coordinated approach which would allow politico-institutional actors such as 
the EU to speak in one, strong and largely coordinated voice that would be both recognisable 
to and resonant with the wider European public (Krzyżanowski and Oberhuber 2007). 
Instead of that, as shown, the EC spokespeople discourse remains largely uncoordinated 
and often creates the image of being a demand-driven jack of all trades trying to colonise as 
many topics and have a say on as many events as possible.  
 
The above points to the fact that, even if modernised somewhat by the use of Twitter and 
other social/online media, EU politico-organizational communication still falls short of playing 
a vital role in effectively politicizing EU institutions. Even if it is deploying social/online media, 
the EU is still not fully able to open its key institutions up to the wider EU public and, by 
breaking out from elite networks, to forge a public dialogue and increase the EU’s political 
legitimacy through an array of communicative practices that would help to decrease 
Eurosceptic moods and attitudes. This, it is claimed, would be of direct relevance to 
effectively communicating how the EU responds to current developments including how, as a 
politico-institutional organism, it faces multiple crises and challenges, including the recent 
fierce wave of right-wing populism and Euroscepticism (incl. in the context of Brexit) that 
undermines the very foundations of the EU-ropean project (Wodak and Krzyżanowski 2017). 
The EU’s political and institutional communication must hence become less accidental and 
more coordinated, reflexive and strategic – all in order to be able to prove the salience of 
European politics for Europe’s society as well as to thereby emphasise the EU’s role as one 
of the key guardians of European liberal democracy.    
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